Policing Protests – is it effective?

I should probably qualify and clarify my policing background before commencing this blog around the policing of the `just stop oil` protest group. I worked the vast majority of my career as a uniformed operational officer and deployed on protests from 1980 through to 2010. In my last 8 years I was posted to the Public Order Branch and managed the Intelligence unit desk which deployed intelligence and evidence gathering teams on every major protest in London. I also worked as part of mutual aid resources with the same teams in many forces across the UK. I believe I am experienced enough to write and comment on the policing of any such protests and tactics used, together with the legal challenges faced by public order policing.           

In the last few weeks, the Metropolitan Police have faced the test of policing various protests by the `just stop oil` group. It is my belief and understanding from open-source material that there has been little co- operation or negotiation with the protest organisers. This makes it exceptionally challenging for the police to decide on resources needed, tactics to be used and areas for deployment. People do have a legitimate right to protest however there are some legal obligations on those organising any processions under Section 11 Public Order Act 1986. The Police rarely take legal action in enforcing the S.11 obligations however the `just stop oil` group tend to arrange assemblies which are covered under section 14 Public Order Act. The Police can impose conditions on such assemblies, but the speed and sporadic method used by the group means that by the time the Police arrive, they have already obstructed the highway and glued themselves to the road. Their objective is clear that they intend to use direct action by obstructing the road network to highlight their cause and affix themselves to the roads, so it takes longer to remove them. The legal powers currently afforded to the Police are of no use when your `assembly` has affixed itself to the roadway and is refusing to move.

I am not about to go into a legal assessment or explanation of the recent supreme court case judgement DPP v Ziegler, however there is a link to it at the base of this blog should you wish to read the sixty- one pages of legal explanation. In my personal summary of that case, it meant the Police must decide a `proportionality` test to any such protest involving obstruction and balance it against Article 10 & 11 of the Human rights act, the rights to expression and assembly. Bear in mind that case has been debated for hours by trained and experienced judges and they have then had time to consider their judgement over a much longer period of time. You may then understand the challenges faced by officers on the street and the command team, in deciding the proportionality test, and whether this specific action is one in which they can lawfully arrest and use force. You can be sure if they act illegally those same critics on non- action will be just as quick to criticise illegal action and all with the benefit of hindsight and a lengthy judicial review.

There has been much discussion and debate on many tv news shows and radio stations around the lack of action by Police when arriving on scene at one of these protests. The officers arriving are part of a much larger operation that has a well- established command structure and decision-making process. Each arrest is likely to require at least two officers and, in these protests, probably more to carry each protestor away. They refuse to comply or voluntarily stand and walk to waiting police vehicles, hence the need for four or five officers to safely remove them. The officers will also need suitable transport for each person arrested with caged vans possibly being required or minibuses for more compliant detainees. For every arrest you lose one or two of the officers deployed at the scene which reduces your capability to manage any ongoing protests or additional people arriving. There have been several suggestions for a more robust or forceful approach by the Police. This is at odds with the frequent complaints of Police being too heavy handed when forcibly removing protestors at other events and the criticism levelled at more direct tactics by Police public order units.

This particular group have evolved their tactics and protest methods from previous environmental groups who often used `lock on` devices to block roads and highways. They have recognised that carrying such devices gave a clear indication of their intentions and led to swift police attendance or even arrest before they could carry out their protest. Any liaison with Police about their intended assembly times and places meant a similar result with officers waiting to meet them and swiftly foiling any attempt to cause and obstruction. The other option is they `liaise` and then do something completely opposite to the intention communicated to the liaison teams. There appears to be now little or no engagement or liaison with `just stop oil` with the police although a few media outlets do seem to be able to be `on scene` exceptionally quickly. This suggests a degree of prior knowledge or liaison with some media outlets who appear content to allow the planned obstruction to take place and then critique time it takes police to react & remove them.

My personal view is that the Met need to adopt a much more direct and robust approach when dealing with this particular group. Since 2009 and the `adapting to protest` report by HMIC was published, policing has been on the back foot when it comes to dealing with protest groups who refuse to engage or commence any dialogue about their intentions. The report was largely based on the presumption that most protest groups can `self- police` and will assemble and hold processions in a well organised and managed fashion. The findings were focussed on crowd psychology and the assumption at the time that public order policing was too forceful and needed to include much more dialogue and liaison so the protest groups could understand the police objectives and intentions. This works well if the dialogue and communication is a two- way process with both parties fully involved and honest with their intentions. In the MPS and many forces across the UK, this change led to more reliance on Police Liaison Teams and a reduction and withdrawal of intelligence and evidence gathering teams. The recognition and identification of groups and individuals likely to be involved in direct action is less evident these days, as the predominant units on protest are directed to liaise, as opposed to update the command team on known/recognised direct action groups. There is little pro activity towards those attending and a return to some more direct policing with intel teams directed to monitor and observe individuals and groups may have an effect. At the very least the command team may have an idea of the possible locations the group are heading towards based on the experience and knowledge of the intel teams.

The increasing calls for more positive police action has been steadily growing over the last seven days and the scale of protests today have escalated with a Van Gogh painting being criminally damaged and the revolving sign at New Scotland Yard suffering a similar fate.

In my view, this has now gone beyond the base public order policing tactic of just liaising and engaging in dialogue with individuals willing to commit acts of criminal damage and hoping they talk to you. Society, or possibly the more vocal minority asked that policing take a lighter approach when policing public order, allow them to protest, the `crowd psychology` will effectively manage any potential disorder. Although there are some merits in generally adopting an approach based on this theory, it does not fit all protests or groups. The Police listened and adapted their approach in dealing with protests, processions, and assemblies.

Is this now a case of be careful what you wish for?

  1. DPP v Ziegler
  • Adapting to Protest 2009

Leave a comment